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EVIDENCE
Good Character of Accused Not Basis for Reasonable
Doubt of Guilt. -In Harper v. Commonwealth, the defendant,
convicted of assault and battery, cites as error the refusal of the
trial court to grant an instruction that an established reputation
of good character will alone create a reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of an accused. The Court speaking through Chief Justice
Hudgins held there was no error, the matter having been decided
previously in Owens v. Commonwealth,2 where it was said, "We
have several times disapproved the phraseology of that portion of
the instruction which would have told the jury that evidence of
the previous good character of the accused may be sufficient to
create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt or innocence." The
Court in that same case laid down the proper instruction as to
character as follows:
"The character of a prisoner when proven whether good or
bad, is a fact to be considered by the jury, but its weight as
affecting the guilt or innocence of a prisoner is a matter for
the determination of the jury in connection with the other
facts proven in the case."
It is not essential for the jury to be told that evidence of good
character was a matter for their consideration, because if it had
not been proper for their consideration its presentation would not
have been allowed.8
Circumstantial Evidence and Its Use In a Criminal Case.
Van Dyke4 appealed his conviction of malicious wounding by the
use of circumstantial evidence. The Court stated that "It has
long been held that circumstantial evidence is legal and competent
in criminal cases, and if it is of such a convincing character as to
exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that the accused is
guilty, it is entitled to the same weight as direct testimony." 5
When a conviction is sought upon circumstantial evidence alone
such evidence is to be acted upon with the utmost caution, and
S196 Va. 723, 85 S.E2d 249 (1955).2 Owens v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 689,43 S.E.2d 895 (1947).
8 James v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 713, 66 S.E.2d 513 (1951).4 Van Dyke v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 1039,86 S.E2d 848 (1955).5 Langley v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 807, 37 S.E. 339 (1900).
before a verdict of guilty will be sustained every fact necessary
to establish the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.,
The rule in Virginia is that where circumstantial evidence is
relied upon to support a conviction the burden is upon the
Commonwealth to show that time, place, motive, means and con-
duct concur in pointing out the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime.7 This has been slightly modified in that proof of motive
does not establish the guilt, nor want of it establish the innocence
of the accused; that while such proof of motive is not necessary,
it is a factor to be considered bearing only upon the question as
to whether or not the accused committed the crime.8
Principles of Corroboration. Three years prior to his
wife's death, G. W. Clay conveyed to his wife two tracts of land
and this suit9 was brought against her heirs to enforce an alleged
oral promise to devise the land back to him should he survive her.
The promise was never mentioned to anyone else during her life-
time nor was there any will found at her death and there was no
conclusive evidence that she ever executed a will. In these cir-
cumstances the husband's testimony as to the promise and the
preparation of the will is not sufficient corroboration. The Court
stated that the character and sufficiency of the corroboration
should be guaged and appraised by the fact sought to be proved.
Just what is necessary to be corroborated must not be over-
looked. 0 Whether corroboration exists and the degree and
quality required are to be determined by the facts and circum-
stances of the particular case. When a confidential relationship
existed between the parties at the time of the transaction relied
on, a higher degree of corroboration is required than in ordinary
transactions."
Credibility of a Lay Witness As To Estimate of Dis-
tance. Lowe was injured and his car demolished when he was
allegedly forced off the road by a truck driven by Barb who was
6 Abdell v. Commonwealth, 173 Va. 458, 2 S.E.2d 293 (1939).
7 Dean v. Commonwealth, 32 Grat. (73 Va.) 912 (1879).
s Ferrell v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 861, 14 S.E.2d 293 (1941).
9 Clay v. Clay, 196 Va. 997, 86 S.E.2d 812 (1955)..
10 Crump v. Gilliam, 190 Va. 935, 59 S.E,2d 72 (1950).
11 Nicholson v. Shockey, 192 Va. 270, 64 S.E.2d 813 (1951).
making a right-hand turn into the street on which Lowe was
approaching. 12 Barb testified that he was never out of his proper
lane, that the two vehicles did not touch, and that he was unaware
that Lowe suffered a mishap after both vehicles had swerved to
avoid a collision. This testimony was not rendered incredible be-
cause of the fact that Barb's estimates of distances and speeds
were not mathematically exact. The testimony of a lay witness
as to his estimates of distance in feet and yards should not be con-
sidered to be mathematically exact. Such testimony at best is: an
approximation involving estimates, best judgments and opinions.
This kind of evidence is peculiarly for a jury. If a witness has
given incorrect estimates of distances where events are happening
quickly, this is a matter to be considered by-the jury in weighing
the testimony. It is not ground for holding that his entire testi-
mony is incredible, unworthy of belief and as a matter of law to
be excluded. 13 Likewise the testimony of the investigating of-
ficer as to his estimate of distance which differed slightly from
the true measured distance was not so inherently incredible as to
be excluded and the verdict of the jury in favor of Barb was re-
instated by the Court.
Credibility and Weight of Evidence Are for the Jury.
Plaintiff administrator recovered a judgment for $15,000 against
defendant railway for the wrongful death of his decedent, who
was killed when the automobile driven by her was struck at a
grade crossing by one of defendant's trains.14 Plaintiff's conten-
tion was that the failure to give crossing warnings required by
statute, proximately caused the collision. On conflicting evidence
the jury was entitled to find that the signals were not given. In
particular, the testimony of an eye witness at the crossing that he
did not hear any signals could not be disregarded as purely nega-
tive in character. No other witness saw this alleged eyewitness at
the scene and his testimony was vigorously attacked as inherently
incredible in that he had a chance to warn the decedent, stopped
on the tracks as to her danger and did not, made no attempt to
signal the engineer as to her peril and left the scene.without in-
quiring as to whether the decedent was killed or injured. It was
12Barb v. Lowe, 196 Va. 1014,86 S.E.2d 854 (1955).
13 Saunders v. Hall, 176 Va. 526, 11 S.E.2d 592 (1940).
14 C. & 0. Railway Co. v. Hanes, Adm'r, 196 Va. 806, 86 SE.2d 122 (1955).
also proven that this eyewitness had been convicted of a mis-
demeanor involving moral turpitude, evidence of such convicti6-
being admissible as bearing on his credibility.15 Despite all this the
weight and credibility of his testimony were for the jury and a
verdict based on such evidence will not be reversed, although the
case was reversed on other grounds.
Evidence of Other Offenses, Inadmissible To Show Dis-
position To Commit Crime Charged. The defendant was found
guilty of attempted rape and sentenced to death.11 The prosecut-
ing witness testified that she was attacked after she alighted from
a bus. Over objection the trial court allowed another witness to
testify that a man whom she identified as defendant chased her
earlier in the evening as she waited for a bus a block away. The
Court found this to be prejudicial error. The accepted rule to be
derived from the case is that evidence which shows or tends to
show the accused guilty of the commission of other offenses at
other times is inadmissible if its only relevance is to show the
character of the accused or his disposition to commit an offense
similar to that charged; but if such evidence as tends to prove any
other relevant fact of the offense charged, and is otherwise ad-
missible, it will not be excluded merely because it also shows him
to be guilty of another crime.17 The principle behind the inad-
missibility of such evidence is that it is a distinct charge, which
the prisoner was not called on to defend, which he could not be
prepared to defend, and which had no such necessary connection
with the transaction then before the court as to be inseparable
from it."' The accused comes to trial to meet the specific charge
against him, not to vindicate or to explain every collateral charge
that may be made in the course of the introduction of the evi-
dence, 19 and the court accordingly reversed the lower court's de-
cision.
Experiment Made Under Different Conditions From
Those of the Accident, Not Admissible. As Hampton was
driving after dark his car went out of control on a sharp left-
15 Taylor v. Commonwealth, 180 Va. 413, 23 S.E2d 139 (1942).
lDay v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 907, 86 S.E.2d 23 (1955).
17 Walker v. Commonwealth, I Leigh (28 Va.) 374 (1829).
18 Ibid.
19 Limbough v. Commonwealth, 149 Va. 383, 140 S.E. 133 (1927).
hand curve, struck a stump and came to rest on the left side of
the road. Decedent Hampton was thrown into the road opposite
the stump. Defendant Lane, who was following Hampton,
rounded the curve and failed to see Hampton's body, which his
car struck and dragged some distance. The only claim of neg-
ligence on the part of the defendant is that by the exercise of
ordinary care in keeping a reasonable lookout, he should have
seen Hampton's body on the road and avoided striking it.20 To
sustain this claim of negligence the decedent's father, over the ob-
jection of the defendant, was permitted to testify that on the day
before the trial during daylight, he drove his truck around the
same curve at the same speed and in the same direction as the two
cars involved in the accident and that an object lying on the hard
surface opposite the stump was visible to him for a distance of
203 feet before reaching it. The purpose of his testimony was
to show that the body of young Hampton, as it lay opposite the
stump was visible to Lane for that distance, had he been keeping
a proper lookout. The Court held it was error to admit this
evidence as the experiment and observation were made under
conditions quite different from those existing at the time of the
accident. The experiment was made during daylight, while the
accident occurred on a dark night. Also at the time of the ex-
periment the witness was on the lookout for an object which he
knew had been placed on the highway for the purpose of being
seen, while under the circumstances of the accident the defendant
was unaware of the presence of his friend's body in the road.
Plainly, under such circumstances, the evidence of this test and
observation was improper.21
One Financially Interested in a Case May Be Called as
an Adverse Witness. In this case involving the Virginia wrong-
ful death statute, the defendants contended that the lower court
erred in refusing to permit them to call decedent's widow as an
adverse witness.22 The defendants failed procedurally to put the
alleged error properly before the court. As the case was re-
manded on other grounds the court said that upon a new trial the
defendants should be permitted to examine the decedent's widow
20 Lane v. Hampton, Adm'r., 197 Va. 46, 87 S.E.2d 803 (1955).
21 Doss v. Roder, 187 Va. 231, 46 SZE.2d 434 (1948).
2 2 Matthews v. Hicks, Adm'r 197 Va. 112, 87 S.E.2d 629 (1955).
as an adverse witness. Va. Section 8-291 of the 1950 Code per-
taiing to adverse witnesses was construed in Butler v. Parrochtn
as follows:
"The only conclusion to be drawn from the language of
the Act and the context of the words, 'having an adverse
interest', is that the legislature intended to include first a
party to the litigation, and second, a person, though not a
party, who had a financial or other personal interest in the
outcome."
Party Bound By His Own Testimony. In this case 4 the
defendant Von Roy made statements which obviously showed
his negligence; however, he defended and won an acquittal by the
jury which on motion the trial court set aside. In affirming the
action of the trial court, the Court repeated a principle often
stated by the Court: No litigant can successfully ask a court or
jury to believe that he has not told the truth. His statements of
fact and the necessary inferences therefrom are binding upon
him. He cannot be heard to ask that his case be made stronger
than he makes it, where as here, it depends upon facts within his
own knowledge and as to which he has testified.25
Uncontradicted Testimony of Defendant Need Not Be
Accepted By Jury If Improbable. The defendant was convicted
of second degree murder and sentenced to 15 years in the pen-
itentiary.2 Among assignment of errors before the Court the
defendant questioned whether the evidence was sufficient to sup-
port the verdict in that the defendant was uncontradicted in his
testimony as to how the homicide occurred. The Court stated
that the jury was not required to believe the defendant's testimony
as to how the killing occurred simply because he said it happened
that way and no witness testified to the contrary. The jury had
the right and the duty to reject his testimony if from its contra-
dictions, or from the improbability of his story and his manner of
relating it, or because of the attending facts and circumstances
there Was reason to believe that he was not speaking the truth.27
2 3 Butler v. Parrocha, 186 Va. 426, 43 S.E.2d 1 (1947).2 4 Von Roy v. Whitescarver, 197 Va. 384, 89 S.E.2d 346 (1955).
= Massie v. Firmstone, 134 Va. 450, 114 S.E. 652 (1922).
2e Farrow v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 353, 89 S.E.2d 312 (1955).
2 7 Randolph v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 256, 56 S.E.2d 226 (1949).
Plaintiff Bound By Adverse Witness Testimony. Plaintiff
was injured when the car which he was driving collided with a
train operated by N & P Belt Line R.R.28 The only evidence as to
the statutory signals being given by the railroad was the negative
testimony of the plaintiff which was without probative value
and the testimony of the engineer of the train who was called as
an adverse witness by plaintiff. The Court held that when a
plaintiff calls a defendant as an adverse witness, while he may not
be bound by such of the witness's statements as may be in con-
flict with the evidence introduced on plaintiff's behalf, he is
bound, and the court and jury are bound, by so much of the
clear, logical testimony of the witness as is reasonable and un-
contradicted.2' The negative evidence of the plaintiff on the
issue as to whether or not the bell was ringing is insufficient to
contradict the positive testimony of the engineer and the plaintiff
is accordingly bound by such evidence.
Blood Analysis, Identification of Sample. The defendant
was involved in a collision and charged with driving under the
influence of intoxicants.80 He demanded and received a blood
test. An analysis of a blood test alleged to be that of the defend-
ant was introduced by the Commonwealth over the objection of
the defendant that such analysis could not be positively identified
as coming from the sample of defendant's blood. Several persons
had participated in the preparation, mailing and examination of
the sample and an unbroken chain could not be established as to
the identity of the particular sample. In proving identity legal
presumption may of course be relied on unless rebutted, e.g., that
articles regularly mailed are delivered in substantially the same
condition in which they were sentel and that an analysis made by
an official in the regular course of his duties was properly made. 2
But where the substance analyzed has passed through several
hands the evidence must not leave it to conjecture as to who had
it and what was done with it between the taking and the analy-
sis.8 It is rudimentary that a specimen taken from a human body
28 Norfolk, Etc. R.R. Co. v. Mueller Co., 197 Va. 533, 90 S.E.2d 135 (1955).
29 Saunders v. Temple, 154 Va. 714, 153 S. E. 691 (1930).
30 Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 527, 90 SE.2d 257 (1955).
Al Schacht v. State, 154 Neb. 858, 50 N.W.2d 78 (1951).
3220 Am. Jur. Evidence, S170-1, pp. 174-178 (1939).
8 Brown v. State, 156 Tex. Cr. 144, 240 S.W.2d 310 (1951).
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for the purpose of analysis must be identified before such speci-
men or any analysis made from it attains standing as evidence" of
the condition of the person whose conduct is questioned. With-
out identification there is no connection between the two. 4
When the Testimony of a Party Is Binding. Plaintiff re-
covered a jury verdict for personal injuries which the lower court
set aside on the ground that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.P This action of the trial court
was based on testimony of the plaintiff that she saw the defend-
ant's car at the intersection five or six car lengths away and
traveling rather fast, approximately thirty-five miles per hour.
Thinking she had time to cross in safety she increased her speed
and entered the intersection where 'the collision occurred. The
defendant's counsel argued that her testimony as to distance and
speed is binding upon her and that she cannot make her case any
stronger than her own recital of the facts, a familiar doctrine.80
In a personal injury case if the plaintiff, a person of average in-
telligence and in possession of his faculties, while detailing the
circumstances of the accident, clearly and unequivocally testifies
to facts which show as a matter of law that he has no case, he is
bound thereby and cannot-recover. Whether such has been the
effect of the litigant's testimony must be determined from a fair
reading of it as a whole, and not merely by reference to isolated
statements which are adverse to his claim.87 Unless testimony of
the litigant shows clearly and unequivocally that he has no case,
or where fair-minded men may differ as to the effect of his testi-
mony, the litigant is not concluded thereby, and in such situations
his testimony is to be considered by the jury along with all of
the other evidence in the case.88
The Court in reversing the trial court said that extracts from
her testimony are not sufficient but that her testimony on the
whole must be examined. Further, testimony of the parties as to
such distance and speed are mere estimates made in fleeting
moments and related months later. Such estimates are mere cir-
84McGowan v. Los Angeles, 100 Cal.App.2d 386, 223 P(2) 862 (1950).
85 Vaughan v. Eatoon, 197 Va. 459, 89 S.E.2d 914 (1955).
" Massie v. Firnistone, 134 Va. 450, 114 S.E. 652 (1922).
8? Tignor v. Virginia Electric Co., 166 Va. 284, 84 SE. 234 (1936).
3s Tennes v. Tennes, 320 11. App. 19, 50 N.E.2d 132 (1943).
cumstances to be considered by the jury in weighing testimony.8
Her testimony viewed in this light and read together does not
show contributory negligence as a matter of law and the verdict
of the jury was reinstated.
When Testimony of Parties Is Binding. Directly beside a
path on plaintiff's land the defendant's workmen left an open
and unguarded hole. Without knowing of this, after dark, plain-
tiff rushed to pick up her child who had fallen in the path oppo-
site the hole, fell and lost consciousness. When she came to her
senses she was sitting on the edge of the hole, injured. She stated
on cross-examination that she did not know just how the accident
happened.40 Defendant contends that if plaintiff did not know
how the accident happened the jury should not have been per-
mitted to speculate on the subject; that the burden was on the
plaintiff to prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence
and to show causal connection between her injury and the exis-
tence of the hole, and that plaintiff's case can be no stronger than
her evidence makes it. The trial court set aside the verdict of the
jury in favor of plaintiff. The Court in reinstating -thl: jury's
verdict stated that unless the testimohy of the plaintiff shows
dearly and unequivocally that he has no case, or where reason-
able men may differ as to the effect of his testimony, then in that
event the plaintiff is not concluded thereby. In such a situation
the question becomes a factual one where the evidence of the
plaintiff is to be considered as a whole, together with other evi-
dence and the issue determined by the jury. The Court cited
Vaughn v. Eatoon, 197 Va. 459, handed down the same day and
reported in detail in this article. The doctrine of Massie v.
Firmstone41 is explained but in no way limited or modified by
these two-cases.
Witness's General Reputation for Truth. At defendant's
trial for rape police officers were allowed to testify that they
knew the reputation for truth of a witness, whose testimony con-
flicted with that of the prosecution, and that it was bad." The
39 Sink v. Masterson, 191 Va. 618,61 S.E.2d 863 (1950).
40 Edmonds v. Mecklenburg Electric Cooperative, 197 Va. 540, 90 S.E.2d 188(1955).
41 See Note 36 supra.
42Bradley v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 1126, 86 S.E.2d 828 (1955).
officers admitted their testimony was based primarily on what
they had heard from fellow officers. The defendant contended
that these officers were not competent to testify as to the reputa-
tion of the witness because they had no opportunity to know his
reputation and had not discussed or heard his reputation discussed
with his associates. The Court stated there was no merit in this
contention and the officers' testimony was properly admitted to
impeach the witness. One of the universally recognized methods
of impeaching a witness is to show his bad reputation for truth
and veracity in the community where he lives, or among his
neighbors and acquaintances by witnesses who know that reputa-
tion.48 The evidence of the impeaching witness must be confined
to the general reputation of the witness for truth and veracity
and he may not testify as to the commission of specific acts of un-
truthfulness or other bad conduct, though these have a bearing on
veracity.44 A witness is competent to testify as to the general
reputation of another who has testified in the case, when he tes-
tifies that he knows that reputation; which is what the people in
the community believe, hence if the impeaching witness is other-
wise competent, the fact that he is not a personal associate of the
person in question, that he is a police officer in the case are mat-
ters for the jury to consider in determining the degree of credit
to be given his testimony, but it is properly admitted.
Hearsay Improperly Admitted and Evidenced Separate
Crime, Prejudicial Error To Admit. Defendant was found
guilty of transporting illegally acquired alcoholic beverages. The
evidence was sufficient to support the conviction where the Com-
monwealth proved that as defendant fled he threw from his car
a jug of bootleg whiskey. As defendant failed to offer proof
that the whiskey was legally acquired he did not overcome the
statutory presumption of illegal acquisition arising from the fact
that the container bore no government stamps. Since this pre-
sumption was not rebutted it prevailed over the presumption of
innocence. The trial court committed error however in per-
mitting one of the arresting officers to testify that he was look-
ing for the defendant on information that he was hauling illegal
whiskey. This evidence was hearsay and clearly prejudicial in
43 Brotherhood of R.T. v. Vickers, 121 Va. 311, 93 S.E. 577 (1917).
44 Fenner v. Commonwealth, 152 Va. 1014, 148 S.E. 821 (1929).
that it conveyed to the jury the information that these officers had
been told by other persons that the defendant was or had been
engaged in the very illegal act for which he was then being tried.
It was also error for the trial court to allow the Commonwealth's
Attorney to cross-examine defendant as to his reckless manner
of driving and to examine the arresting officers on this point, and
the fact that he had narrowly avoided a collision with another car
at an intersection. This evidence tended to show not only that
the defendant had fled to escape arrest which is admissible, but
also that he had been guilty of reckless driving, a distinct and
separate offense from that for which he was being tried. It was
therefore prejudicial to the defendant in that it showed that he
was a violator of the law in other respects. 45
R. H. Lewis
45 Sturgis v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 264, 88 S.E.2d 919 (1955).
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